Ineffective institutions and bad governance increase transaction costs and reduce international transport flows. In this paper, we empirically investigate this basic notion, and we show that it can account for several, so far, somewhat puzzling results in the empirical literature estimating gravity equations of bilateral trade. More specifically, we show that differences in the quality and effectiveness of institutions offer an explanation for the tendency of OECD countries to trade disproportionately with each other, and with non-OECD countries, as well as for the positive effect of GDP per capita on bilateral trade.
INTRODUCTION
Reductions in transport costs are important drivers behind increased specialization and associated increases in welfare. They contribute to complex network structures and increased interdependencies between actors across the globe, but also to increased flows of goods and services with oftentimes substantial negative impacts on, for example, environmental quality and traffic safety. It is more and more recognised that institutional quality and the quality of governance is an important determinant of variations in transport costs. Where traditional studies have proxied the importance of transport costs for explaining trade by simple measures of distance, more recent contributions have explicitly paid attention to institutional quality as one of the key dimensions of transport costs [1] [2] [3] .
This paper aims to contribute to our understanding of the quantitative importance of institutions in explaining variation in bilateral trade. Institutions are defined as formal rules and informal practices devised to reduce the uncertainty in exchange. The quality of institutions affects the transaction costs incurred in trade, explaining the importance of effective domestic institutions for trade 4 . We will exploit this simple notion that institutions matter to try and resolve two existing puzzles in the gravity literature, in which the intensity of bilateral trade is explained by a range of explanatory variables such as the economic mass of the trading partners, distance between the trading partners, etc.
The first puzzle was explicitly identified in a recent study by Rose 5 who concluded that membership in the OECD (Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development) has a strong and robust positive effect on trade. He argued that this finding was somewhat of a surprise, because the OECD neither has the formal power to enforce trade liberalization, nor is it exclusively dedicated to the purpose of liberalization. Why, then, do OECD member countries trade disproportionately with each other?
The second puzzle has been identified in, for example, Frankel 6 , Deardorff 7 and Anderson and Marcouiller 3 . Many studies have found that bilateral trade increases with the levels of GDP per capita in the trading countries 8, 9 . Deardorff 7 , for example, has summarized the stylized facts as follows: 'high-income countries trade disproportionately more with all trading partners and not just among themselves, while low-income countries trade less'. However, there is no clear theoretical explanation for the positive effect of per capita income levels on aggregate bilateral trade.
The hypothesis that we will test is that both the OECD effect and the GDP per capita effect that is typically found in the gravity literature are driven by the fact that OECD countries, as well as countries with high per capita income are in general countries with relatively good institutions. In other words, we hypothesise that the results on the OECD effect and the GDP per capita ef-fect are due to omitted variable bias, where the OECD dummy and GDP per capita act as proxies for institutional quality and institutional homogeneity. We do so by focusing on the OECD effect and GDP per capita effect in a standard gravity model and by simultaneously addressing the relevance of the quality and homogeneity of institutions in explaining bilateral trade. We show that the similarity and high quality of institutions of OECD countries as well as of countries with a high per capita income provide a plausible explanation for the positive effects of the OECD dummy and GDP per capita that have previously been found in the literature.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 introduces our gravity model and the data we have used. Section 3 presents the results. The final section summarizes the main findings of the analysis.
A GRAVITY APPROACH TO TRADE WITH INSTITUTIONS
The gravity model of bilateral trade is a successful tool in empirical accounts of bilateral trade flows. It is nowadays the workhorse model of applied international economics 10 . The gravity model owes its name to Newton's model in physics in which the gravitational force between two bodies positively depends on the mass of those bodies and negatively on their distance. In its most simple form, a gravity model in international trade defines the bodies as countries, uses GDP to reflect 'mass', and proxies distance by distance between the capitals of the respective countries. Apart from being successful empirically, the gravity model in international trade has more recently also received theoretical support and is firmly based within a variety of trade theories 7 . Typical applied papers in the field elaborate on the before-mentioned most simple form of the gravity model and incorporate other proxies for mass and distance. The basic gravity equation that we will estimate and that incorporates institutional factors looks as follows: where i and j denote the exporting and importing country. The dependent variable T ij is aggregate merchandise exports from i to j for 1998. The independent variables are, respectively: national income (Y), the distance between i and j (D ij ), and dummies reflecting whether i and j share: a land border (Adj), their primary language (Lang), membership in a regional Preferential Trade Agreement (PTA), their main religion (Religion), and whether they were part of a common colonial empire (Col). These variables are standard in empirical studies using gravity models to explain variation in trade. The variables of particular interest in this paper are a variable to capture institutional quality (Inst) and a dummy indicating whether both countries share a relatively similar institutional capacity. The final term is the stochastic error term, which captures all other effects on trade, and is assumed to be well-behaved. The gravity model estimates are acquired using OLS.
The data on bilateral merchandise trade are from the UN COMTRADE database, accessed using the World Bank WITS interface. Bilateral trade between 109 countries is considered for 1998. * Data on institutional quality were collected from the database compiled by Kaufmann et al. 11 . They have combined data on the subjective quality of institutions (for 2000-01) into six equally scaled summary-indicators of different aspects of governance. Because the separate indicators of governance are highly correlated, we have taken the sum of the scores on all indicators as an overall score for the level of effectiveness of a country's institutional framework. The mean value for the composite indicator on institutional effectiveness in our country-sample is 0.97, with a standard deviation of 5.02. The indicator is scaled from about −15 to +15. Furthermore, we have defined a dummy variable that equals 1 if the absolute difference in institutional quality between countries i and j is lower than two standard deviations of our indicator. A value of one indicates that the two countries have a similar level of institutional quality. For more detailed information on the data and variables, see the Appendix.
RESULTS
This section presents the results of our empirical analysis. We first show the basic results of the empirical gravity model discussed in the previous section. Subsequently, we address the two puzzles that we identified in the introduction, viz. the positive effect of OECD mem-* The available number of country pairs varies across specifications, because of missing data on bilateral trade and some of the explanatory variables (GDP, GDP per capita and institutional quality).
bership on trade and the effect of GDP per capita.
The effect of institutions
Estimating equation (1) using Ordinary Least Squares gives rise to the estimated coefficients and associated standard errors as reported in the first column of Table 1 . Our model explains 66% of the total variation in bilateral trade, as shown by the value of R 2 . The results for the traditional variables are as expected. A one percent increase in GDP of the exporter (importer) increases trade by 1.19 (0.85)%, whereas a one percent increase in distance reduces bilateral trade by 1.19%. Also the effects of a common border, common language, belonging to the same trade area, sharing a common religion and sharing a common colonial history as captured by the subsequent dummy variables in Table 1 are conform expectations: they all positively influence bilateral trade. To give an indication of the magnitude of the effect, countries sharing a common language trade -ceteris paribus − 40% (100 × (e 0.34 − 1)) more with each other than countries that do not share a common language.
Considering the key variables of interest in our analysis, a high quality of institutions in either the exporting or importing country stimulates trade, as can be Note: Standard errors of the estimated coefficients are reported in parentheses in the line below the parameter estimates. Statistical significance is indicated with stars, where *, ** and *** reflects significance at 10, 5 and 1%, respectively (two-sided t-test).
seen from the benchmark specification in the first column of Table 1 . The effect is significant, both statistically and economically. As an indication of the economic importance of effective high-quality institutions, we compare an importing country that has institutional quality of one standard deviation above the sample mean with a country that has an average score on institutions. The former will import about 22% more from any third country than the latter. Separately from the effect of good quality, bilateral difference in the effectiveness of institutions has a statistically significant, positive effect on trade as well.
Traders from countries that differ considerably in their effectiveness of institutions are unfamiliar with each other's level of security in exchange. The business procedures and conventions that they have developed to use their institutional capacity as effectively as possible are not compatible 2 . On the other hand, if institutions are sufficiently similar, familiarity will reduce transaction costs and raise bilateral trade. Homogeneity of institutions increases trade by an estimated 13% (100 × (e 0.12 − 1)).
The OECD-effect
Next, we turn to the investigation of the puzzle of the OECD effect as described in Section 1. The key results are contained in Specifications 2-4 in Table 1 . A first thing to note is that the estimates for the standard gravity variables (GDP and distance) and the additional 'standard' proxies for distance as discussed in Section 3.1 are fairly stable in terms of size as well as significance of the coefficients.
In order to investigate the effect and meaning of OECD membership, we start with a standard gravity model without institutions (Specification 2 in Table 1 ). In that case, OECD-membership independently raises trade above the levels we would expect on the basis of these countries' basic characteristics 5 . OECD-membership seems to create more trade with non-members (+34%), than with fellow members (+16%), all else equal. For comparison, Rose's benchmark specification estimates the effect of joint OECD-membership on trade at +55%, and the effect of single membership of the OECD at +49%. * Adding institutional quality to the model turns the otherwise robust effect of OECD-membership on trade completely upside down. The residual effect of OECDmembership on bilateral trade is strongly and statistically significantly negative (Specification 3). It is hard to believe that membership of the OECD negatively influences trade. Still, the effect seems strong enough to argue that it is substantive. The estimated effect of institutions remains significantly positive. This corroborates the hypothesis that OECD countries trade more because of their effective domestic institutions.
In Specification 4, we have also included institutional homogeneity in the gravity model. This does not change the effect of either the quality of institutions, or of joint membership in the OECD on trade. However, the residual effect of single membership on bilateral trade becomes smaller and statistically insignificant. This suggests that low trade between an OECD-member and a non-member is partly caused by the difference in institutional effectiveness.
GDP per capita effects
Finally, we discuss the GDP per capita effects. As discussed in Section 1, a variable that is typically included in standard gravity equations is GDP per capita. The theoretical foundation for inclusion of per capita income is oftentimes not clear. Neither Heckscher-Ohlin theory, nor the preference-based theory of Linder would predict the relation between trade and GDP per capita levels found empirically. These explanations would either predict that rich countries trade more with poor countries, because of comparative cost differences, or that rich countries and poor countries trade more amongst themselves, because of combined similarities in tastes and comparative costs 7 . These patterns both do not accord well with the stylized facts observed by Deardorff. As shown by Frankel et al. 12 , these effects should be properly captured by absolute differences in GDP per capita between the trading countries, rather than the respective levels of per capita income. ** Many studies, alternatively, motivate the inclusion of GDP per capita levels by arguing that higher income per capita allows for more specialization and enhances intraindustry trade in a wider variety of products 10, [12] [13] [14] . A positive effect of GDP per capita would indicate the rel-* Rose uses panel data, which generates variation over time as well as across countries. Perhaps the closest comparable specification involves a cross-section estimate for 1995, reported in his Table 2 . Like in our results, the effect of joint membership on trade (+46%) is lower than the effect of single membership (+63%). ** At the disaggregate level of trade, there is more reason to include the level of GDP per capita in both countries as explanatory variables for sectoral trade. It can, for example, reflect the effect of the extent of comparative advantage or of preferences for goods from a particular sector (vis-à-vis the rest of the world) on the size of a country's export and import in that sector. At the aggregate level, however, one has to focus on bilateral differences in comparative advantages and tastes (reflected by differences in GDP per capita) to explain aggregate bilateral trade. This reflects the fact that, at the aggregate level, all countries have comparative advantages or preferences for something.
evance of new trade theory models of product differentiation. However, theories of imperfect competition and trade also do not imply a definite role for income per capita, as opposed to total domestic income 6 . Potential export supply and import demand are already reflected by the levels of GDP, rather than GDP per capita 15 . In fact, these models imply that a smaller country (with lower GDP) is more specialized, and depends more on trade for its consumption of a wide variety of products.
In this section, we empirically test the hypothesis that variation in the quality of institutions between wealthy and less developed countries offers an explanation for the positive relation between trade and per capita income levels estimated by standard gravity equations. Our investigation proceeds as follows. We start from the basic model with institutions presented in Section 3.1 (specification 1 in Tables 1 and 2) . We subsequently present a standard specification of the gravity model, without institutions, that includes GDP per capita (of both the exporting and importing country). In this basic specification without institutions, income per capita has a strong and significant, positive effect on bilateral trade. Note: Standard errors of the estimated coefficients are reported in parentheses in the line below the parameter estimates. Statistical significance is indicated with asterisks, where *, ** and *** reflects significance at 10, 5 and 1%, respectively (two-sided t-test).
This is the finding that has been reported frequently in other gravity model studies and that we alluded to in Section 1. Our estimates in Specifications 3 and 4 show that the positive effect of income per capita is not robust to the introduction of institutions. When both are included, per capita income turns out to have a negative and insignificant effect on trade, whereas quality and similarity of institutions still have a significantly positive and robust effect on trade. We thus find that institutions are dominant in explaining why rich countries trade more in general. After controlling for the effectiveness of institutions, rich countries have lower trade than expected, although the effect is small and statistically imprecise. Anderson and Marcouiller 3 argue that excluding institutional effectiveness from the gravity model can obscure a negative relation between income per capita and expenditure shares on traded merchandize, because of the high correlation between per capita income and the quality of governance. This relation between the share of expenditure on traded merchandize and GDP per capita results from a shift in the structure of production and consumption, from commodities into services. The shift in expenditure shares offers an explanation for the finding that wealthy countries engage in less commodity trade, all else equal, after the effects of institutions have been included.
CONCLUSIONS
Institutions that reduce uncertainty in exchange and lower transaction costs matter for international trade. Moreover, similarity of the institutional environment, in terms of the security of property rights and contract enforceability, raises bilateral trade by lowering unfamiliarity and transaction costs. This provides support for the view that intangible, largely unobserved barriers to trade help explain why trade costs remain large, offering insights in the true mechanisms that explain variation in bilateral trade. The results in this paper thus underline the relevance of investing in good governance in order to increase the potential to benefit from international trade.
Apart from this conclusion, we can exploit the notion that informal trade barriers matter to provide insight into two puzzles in the empirical literature on bilateral trade. Both member countries of the OECD and countries with a high GDP per capita trade more than basic gravity variables can explain. This paper has shown that variation in the quality of domestic institutions explains why wealthy countries in general, and OECD-countries in particular, are relatively attractive trade partners. Institutions that are effective in the defence of property rights decrease the insecurity of international transactions, and lower transaction costs. As a result, bilateral trade is more beneficial. If we include measures of institutional effectiveness in an otherwise standard gravity model, they turn out to be positively and significantly related to bilateral trade flows. The residual effect of OECD-membership on bilateral trade with both a fellow OECD-country and a non-OECD country is significantly negative. Moreover, the impact of GDP per capita turns insignificant and negative once institutional variables are taken into account by the model. Both findings may reflect the influence of a shift in production and expenditure towards services and non-tradeables with rising per capita incomes.
contiguity. ** This part of our database is available upon request from the corresponding author. Some remarks on these variables are in place:
Many costs of trade are related to geographical distance, from physical transport costs of goods and persons to the costs of cultural unfamiliarity. As conventional in the literature, geographical distance has been measured as the distance from home to foreign 'as the bird flies', using the principal city of each country as its centre of gravity. This implies that the distance between the two centres of gravity of neighbouring countries is likely to overestimate the average distance of trade between them. The argument that the distance measure used leads to an overestimate of the distance of trade holds true for all pairs of countries. However, its relative impact is much larger in neighbouring countries than in countries that are far away from each other. Not all countries in our dataset were represented in the database for bilateral distances. For these countries, proxies were constructed using distances from neighbouring countries that were included in the database. For more discussion of the use and usefulness of other, more sophisticated measures of geographical distance, see Frankel 6 . In general, more sophisticated measures do not change the estimation results much, and cannot eliminate the measurement error for contiguous countries either. The common land border dummy indicates whether two countries are adjacent. Measurement error in the distance variable, as well as the effect of historical relations between adjacent countries are captured by this dummy-variable. For countries in our data set that had no adjacency data available from the main source, the CIA factbook (www.cia.gov/cia/publications/factbook) was used to determine whether they shared borders with any other country in the data set.
To assess commonality in primary language, we used a database that distinguished fourteen languages: Arabic, Burmese, Chinese, Dutch, English, French, German, Greek, Korean, Malay, Persian, Portuguese, Spanish and Swedish. In case none of these applied or no data were available, the categories 'other language' and 'non available' were assigned. Using the CIA factbook, these countries have been checked. A dummy variable reflects whether or not two countries have the same primary language, an important aspect of cultural similarity. Whether pairs of countries take part in common trade agreements has been assessed using OECD data on major regional integration agreements. * A dummy variable (common trade bloc) indicates whether a pair of countries enters into at least one common regional Preferential Trade Agreement. Cultural and/or historical ties between countries may also consist of a common dominant religion or a shared colonial past. Data for religion and colonial background have been taken from Salai-Martin 16 . Percentages of the population that adhere to one of seven major religions are presented. These religions are: Buddhism, Catholicism, Confucianism, Hinduism, Judism religion, Islam, and Protestantism. For some countries, two religions were equally dominant over the others. These countries entered into the analysis with both religions as the dominant religion. Commonality of dominant religion implies a value of 1 for the dummy variable 'common religion'. The dummy variable 'common colonizer' reflects for each pair of countries whether both of them share a similar colonial history. The data considered the British, French and Spanish empires only. We also included the colonizers themselves into the respective empires, contrary to the original source. In this way, the figures identify shared colonial relations for pairs of countries.
